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WHAT GOES ON HERE
An article by
S. Wild, Jr.

Payson

Americans, like most human beings, recoil at the thought of
war, and the idea of another war, a World War III, seems repulsive
beyond description. However, here and there in our country, there
are voices which are saying that we should engage in a so-called
"preventive war" against Russia. Some of these voices are scarcely
raised above a whisper, but the mere fact that a conflict against the
Soviets is being urged at all is of considerable significance. Be
cause this subject is so highly explosive, it might be argued that
it should be kept under cover, but in a democracy such as ours, ex
perience indicates that it is healthier to bring a discussion out into
the open where it can be appraised on its merits rather than to
treat it as something "hush-hush." Therefore, let's face up to the
issues involved, however unpalatable they may be, and let's bring
the problem out into the daylight where a more careful examina
tion is possible.

Why Some People Favor a "Preventive War"
The premise of those who favor our making war against the
Soviet Union in the near future is a very simple one, namely, that
war between the United States and Russia is inevitable anyway, so
why shouldn't we fight when the odds seem favorable to us? Pro
ponents of a "preventive war" on our part maintain that the Com
munists, and this includes the Soviet leaders, believe that a war to
· the finish between communism and capitalism must come some
time and that according to the philosophy of communism, the inProfessor Wild is Professor of Government and Dean of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University. This arti
cle is a reprint of Prof. Wild's article as it appeared in the June 1949
issue of Woman's Day. Prof. Wild served for many years as Associate
for International Law at the Naval War College.
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terests of a Communist state and those of a non-Communist power
are irreconcilable. Therefore, since peaceful coexistence between
Russia and the United States is impossible from the point of view
of the Kremlin itself, it behooves us, says the "preventive war"
school, to prepare now for the showdown and to attack when it suits
us and not the Communists.
Those who would have us launch the war first thus cite the
Communist texts on the inevitability of war between the rival ide
ologies and also the statements of Russian officials to the effect that
capitalism is an enemy which must be vanquished by force.

The

violent anti-American tone of the Russian press and radio, the war
like speeches of the high Soviet command and the constant stream
of denunciations of the West pouring from behind the Iron Curtain
all indicate, it is alleged, that the Soviet Union is convinced that the
"cold war" must get really "hot" in the future.

Analyzing Soviet

psychology and reasoning, "preventive war" supporters declare that
the basic strategy of communism never changes and that this
strategy is based on the assumption that capitalist nations and the
capitalist class must in time be liquidated by violence and war. That,
it is maintained, is the ultimate goal of Russian Communist thinking.
Furthermore, say such supporters, we should not be deceived
by day-to-day changes or modifications in Communist tactics. When
it seems advisable or convenient, the Russian government may talk
peace or make concessions and Stalin may utter soothing words or
agree to treaties which contain appealing phrases but all this, it is
asserted, is just a matter of expediency and temporary a�justment
which does not alter the hard core of Communist strategy built on
the doctrine of an ultimate war to the finish.
The Russians, therefore, will not hesitate to attack us, say
the "preventive war" people, when they feel that they are ready.
And when will they be ready? Here's where the atomic bomb comes

36

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss9/4

2

Wild: What Goes on Here

RESTRICTED
into the argument. Back in 1945, just after Hiroshima, the scient
ists estimated that it would take the Russians from three to five

years to produce an atomic bomb of their own. Nearly four years
have passed since then and time is growing short, if the estimates

are correct.

Nowadays, some atomic experts say it may be 1952 or

1953 before the Russians can produce the bomb with any degree

of success, but what will happen when the American monopoly comes
to an end?

At that point, say those favoring a "preventive war,"

our present advantage stemming from our sole possession of the
bomb will be gone and we shall be at the mercy of the ruthless dis

ciples of Marx and his class-war school who will not hesitate to

obliterate our cities when they deem themselves ready.

Therefore, it is argued, why should we not attack fairly soon

before the Russians get the bomb and prevent them from waging

war on us at a later time? That's why there is talk of a

ventive war," a

"pre

war to forestall a later Soviet onslaught which, it is

declared, is bound to come at some point.

This argument is but

tressed by references to the Russian stand on the international con

trol of atomic energy in the United Nations. If, it is asked, the Soviet

Union genuinely desired peace, why didn't she subscribe to the plan

for placing all fissionable material under the direction of an inter

national agency, as proposed by the United States and all the non
Communist members of the United Nations, thus removing atomic

energy from the authority of any national government? Soviet op
position to international control and Soviet insistence on freedom

to manage atomic energy plants on her own, proves, it is claimed,

that Russia wants to stock-pile bombs for her own purposes, which
include a war against us when she thinks the time is ripe.

Believers in a "preventive war" go on to describe what they

think the situation will be like once the Russians acquire the bomb.
They predict that it will be a time of almost unbearable tension.

We shall be living in a war atmosphere, they say, with the threat of
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terrible destruction hanging over us. Because there seems to be
no adequate defense against an atomic bomb attack, the advantage
lies with the attacker who will endeavor to destroy or paralyze his
foe before the latter has a chance to retaliate or rally for a come
back. Unlik� 1917 or 1941, . we shall not have time, it is said, to
mobilize in a relatively leisurely fashion. To forestall the dreadful
consequences of being attacked in an atomic war, each side will be

under an almost overwhelming temptation to make a surprise at.;
tack first, it is declared, and with the Russians in possession of the
bomb, we shall be at the mercy of the Rusisan Communists unless
we destroy them first.
The logic of the "preventive war" school is thus clear: the
Communists will make war on us sometime, believing as they do
that such a war is inevitable, and are holding off until they acquire

the atomic bomb and find the moment auspicious for their purposes;
If that is the case, then why shouldn't we move up the time for the
war while we alone have the bomb and in the name of our own self.,.
defense strike while we have superiority instead of remaining pass
ive while they prepare to hit us at their convenience?
It is argued, however, that the United States, as a dem
ocracy with
Constitution which requires a vote in Congress be
fore we can legally make war, is not the kind of nation which can
wage a "preventive war," that is, a war in which we suddenly at
tack on our own initiative. To this the "preventive war'' people re
ply that (1) the President and the military establishment should

a

go ahead anyway and take quick military action without a delayed
build-up in public opinion and in Congress, explaining the reasons
later, and (2) the Russians are taking advantage of our good nature
and our democratic ways. They know, it is claimed, that despite
their belief in an inevitable armed clash, we are not the sort of
country which will unleash an unprovoked attack. Our very virtues
are our undoing, it is asserted; therefore, in dealing with a dictator-
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ship which can operate with speed and which can go to war without
consulting the people of Russia, we should, it is urged, be prepared
to move swiftly ourselves and thus surprise the Soviet rulers who
are counting on our hatred of war and our reluctance to attack
first as a means for allowing them to "blitz" us at a time of their
choosing.
What Opponents of a "Preventive War" Say

The arguments against the "preventive war" philosophy fall
into at least three main categories. One stresses the difficulties of a
"preventive war" purely from the military point of view, a second
challenges the assumption that war is inevitable and a third main
tains that military force by itself cannot eradicate the menace of
communism. Involved in the second and third arguments is really
a fourth, namely, the point of view of morality which questions
the right to bring on deliberately the horrors, death and destruction
of war on the grounds of a hypothesis, the hypothesis or assumption
that war is inevitable when that hypothesis cannot really be proved.
Taking up the military problem first, critics of the ''pre
ventive war" idea assert that its advocates seem to assume that
defeating Soviet Russia would involve merely tossing some atomic
bombs on Russian cities and that after that,the Soviet Union would
cry quits and sue for peace. The attitude that victory over Russia
could be gained in this fairly easy and relatively effortless fashion
is seriously questioned, however, by many experts, both military and
civilian, who have studied the problem. In the first place, these ex
perts say that Russia is so vast and the dispersion of industry and
resources is on such an enormous scale that atomic bombing of cer
tain cities would be insufficient for a knockout blow. Furthermore,
it is claimed, at the first sign of attack the Russian army would
sweep over Western Europe and ensconce itself in virtually every
corner of that continent. Would we then drop atomic bombs on Paris,
39
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Brussels, Rome and other cities inhabited by peoples friendly to us
in order to disrupt Russian military establishments?
be a tough question to decide.

That would

Above all, say the experts, the war could not be won by

bombs alone.

In the last analysis, it is troops which would have

to support air attack and carry the day by actually defeating the

armed forces of the enemy.

Therefore, so goes the argument,

we should have to be prepared to transport armies overseas, land

them in Europe, and smash the Soviet military machine in direct

combat.

In other words, if the Soviets occupied Europe, we would

have to have another "D-Day" all over again and would have to

challenge a powerful foe well entrenched behind the Atlantic sea
wall.

Even if resistance in the West prevented the Russians from

smashing immediately to the ocean, huge American reinforcements

would have to be ready for fighting in Europe. The experiences of
both Napoleon and Hitler in trying to conquer Russia are cited as

evidence of the extreme difficulty which might be encountered if
an attempt were made to invade Russia itself, a land which

stretches thousands of miles from Poland across Siberia to the
Pacific.

Then, say the "preventive war" opponents, suppose Russia

is vanquished, suppose that even air attacks brought about Soviet

peace overtures, we would still have to send a huge army of occupa

tion to insure Russian compliance with our peace terms.

Equipping

and maintaining the large armies needed both for war and for or

cupation would, it is claimed, strain the American economy to the
utmost.

Our way of life would be transformed; we would have to

become, state some experts, a military nation, with our manpower
and industry geared to the needs of a titanic military establishment.

Our relaxed, democratic ways, our production of civilian goods, our

peacetime pursuits would all disappear under the harsh necessity
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of supporting naval, ground and air forces capable of subduing a
powerful enemy and of holding him down afterward.
A "preventive war," therefore, is not something to be en
tered upon lightly. Those who have misgivings about such an en
terprise emphasize the tremendous problems involved and stress
what such a war would do to our democracy. They declare that a war
against Russia could not possibly be worth the carnage, devasta
tion and ruinous economic burdens entailed and suggest that it
would be such a disaster in so many ways that it should be thought
of only as a last resort when absolutely no other alternative giving
us a chance for survival seemed at hand.
Is War Inevitable?
Next, fault is found with the assumption that war with the
Soviet Union is inevitable. Those not in sympathy with the
"preventive war" point of view sometimes concede that war is pos
sible and that Communist ideology stresses the inevitability of a
showdown fight between communism and rival ideologies. They
may admit also that Russian behavior since 1945 has appeared to
be belligerent and non-cooperative. However, the opposition be
lieves that there is a chance, and not a slender one at that, that the
Soviet system can be halted without a war. It is pointed out that
the Kremlin leaders have pushed ahead whenever the going looked
easy, as in Eastern Europe, but that they have hesitated and acted
cautiously when confronted by formidable power. This line of
reasoning maintains that the Communist bosses are realists and,
unlike Hitler, are rational; that is, they will not go adventuring if
the odds look so great against them that they might lose. There
fore, it is contended that if the United States and like-minded na
tions build up a power coalition which out-balances the U. S. S. R.,
the Russians will be deterred from attacking, should they be so
minded, and will refrain from pressing matters to the breaking
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point. Furthermore, there are some who believe that the U. S. S. R.
has no aggressive designs whatsoever and that Russian moves
since 1945 have been primarily defensive anyway.
The concept of a power alignment offsetting Russian power
as a means of inducing the Soviets to refrain from warlike actions,
if they have any such intentions, underlies the whole American
policy of "containment" as expressed in the Truman doctrine, aid to
Greece and Turkey and the Atlantic Pact. The hope is that the prns
pect of being confronted by superior force will remove any tempta
tion on the part of the Communists to engage in an all-out war. Re-·
inforcing this view is the claim that the Communists themselves
are in no hurry, believing as they do that time is on their side and
that no exact timetable of conquest on Hitler's model is necessary,
and that if we can hold firm indefinitely, they can be contained in
definitely. Thus, in time, they will come to accept the fact, it is said,
that they must adjust to a situation in which a larger measure of
cooperation is the only alternative to a hopeless war. Isn't it
better, ask the "preventive war" critics, to proceed on these lines
and to take the chance of averting war in this fashion, than to pro
voke hostilities deliberately and bathe the world in blood on the
basis of an uproved assumption that such a holocaust must come
anyway?
What happens when the Russians get the bomb? Here
again the opponents of a "preventive war" admit that there will be
severe tension and considerable danger. But, it is said, we have
such a head start and will have so many more bombs available than
they at any given point, that they will not be assured of any easy
success should they decide to unleash a surprise attack. Provided
we disperse our atomic resources so that we could survive an initial
blow with considerable stores of bombs left for a counterattack,
the Russians would have to reckon with a retaliatory onslaught, the
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thought of which, it is asserted, ought to operate as a fairly ef
fective deterrent. Thus, if we build up power on our side, and pre
pare sensibly for a possible surprise blow against us, we should, it
is argued, be able to convince the Russians that war would be too
dangerous for them. In time, then, they would have to settle down
and recognize that the goal of world communism was impossible of
achievement without risks which would appear overwhelming.
Above all, say those opposed to a "preventive war," by avoiding
hysteria and provocative measur�s which could goad Russia into
belligerent countermoves and by keeping the diplomatic situation
fluid, with room for negotiation, we can, with careful leadership,
a1-rive at a stable relationship.

A "Preventive War" and Communism
A third major argument against a "preventive war" is that
even if it were successful in destroying Russian military power, it
would not eliminate communism. In fact, some declare, such an at
tack by us would stimulate its growth. The contention is that com
munism is an idea which appeals to people who are in distress and
who are dissatisfied with existing conditions, and which thrives on
disorder and chaos. Therefore, the claim is, unless we help to im
prove the lot of millions throughout the globe who see in communism
a chance to alter a state of affairs which they consider unsatisfac
tory, we shall not win them as converts to our cause.
Difficult as it is for us to realize, communism as an idea, it
is pointed out, has an appeal for the impoverished and the dis
possesssed who long to improve their status. The reality of com
munism in Russia and in the satellite states is one thing but to
people in Asia, Africa and the Near East who hear only the Com
munist promises of education, of more material goods, of medical
care and of "freedom" for the masses, the dream of communism
has a drawing power which, it is maintained, can be counteracted
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best by our showing that our way offers at least as much and a lot
more. Those who do not countenance the thought of a "preventiv�
war" insist, therefore, that a military conquest of Russia would not
eradicate the roots of communism which flourish in discontent and
misery. We would still, after victory, have to take care of the popula
tions who have proved susceptible to communist propaganda. And a

war, it is stated, would increase the unrest and reduce the standards

of living making more friends for communism than ever.

We and the Communists are struggling to capture men's
minds. Military means alone, say the foes of a "preventive war," do

not win out in this psychological struggle: you can't spread dem
ocracy by bayonets and machine guns. If we attacked Russia first,

wouldn't we, it is asked, play right into the hands of the Com
munists who would say, "See, we told you those capitalists were

warmongers who don't care about human welfare and who don't
shrink at wholesale slaughter"? How would we look to the rest
of the world?

Alternatives to War
Ideas and ideals have tremendous power in themselves, and

military force by itself is sterile, as Hitler's efforts to win con
quered populations by repression alone has shown.

Hence, say

those condemning a "preventive war," it is up to us to prove that
democracy is better and has more to offer materially and morally

than communism, and we can't do that solely by a display of armed
might.

Creating a defensive military alignment to hem in Soviet

expansionism may be a necessary step but, it is alleged, this is

largely a negative measure which mu�t be coupled with a positive

policy of outbidding the Communists in terms of benefits and ideo
logical appeal.

Communist ideology will be beaten, therefore, not

by force but by a better ideological and material offensive on our
part,

it

is claimed.
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At this point, "preventive war" opponents call attention to

the fact that we Americans are really revolutionaries in the modern
world.

ments.

Peoples everywhere have been stirred by our accomplish
They want what we have to offer and can produce.

Amer

ican movies and the gadgets such as cigarette lighters, wrist

watches, fountain pens and knives carried by our GI's to all corners

of the earth have, for example, created a demand for such items by

populations everywhere.

These peoples are not content with their

present material standards and are demanding and pressing for a
share of the wonders which the United States has on display.

The

United States has created a global ferment and the Communists in

many instances have capitalized on this unrest by promising to fill

such wants . But Soviet production is now unequal to the task. An

imaginative America, it is declared, can take the initiative from

communism by sharing our "know how" and turning our technical

skill in the direction of assisting others to participate more fully in

the benefits to be derived from our type of enterprise under demo

cratic auspices.

Instead of waging war to beat communism, it is argued that

we can come out on top, through skillful diplomacy and by adding a

program of economic and social welfare to our defensive military

arrangements.

In this fashion, say the exponents of this position,

we may avoid the horrors of war, and assume an unassailable type

· of leadership in world affairs which will win us firm friends and
pull the props out from Communist arguments.

To· attack Russia

first would mean, according to this thesis, that we would sacrifice

our moral hold on men's minds and would enable the Communists

to call us selfish imperialists bent on global supremacy for the sake

of profits and power.

In line with this argument, Mr. David E.

Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said re

cently, "There are those among us who have been bewitched by

the atomic bomb........But it is important for us to recognize that
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neither the atomic bomb nor any form of power........constitutes the
true source of American strength........That source is our ethical and
moral standards of precepts and our democratic faith in man. This
faith is the chief armament of our democracy.

potent weapon ever devised."

It is the most
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